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venting the spirit and harmony of Robinson-Patman, by allowing the practice
of temporary price discrimination, the overall effect of which will cause that
potential danger of substantially lessening competition which the Act seeks
to prohibit. While it is true that the court in the scope of its appellate re-
view may upset the Commission's findings if they are not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole," the courts should scrupulously
avoid hamstringing the Commission in carrying out the basic purposes of the
Act, by imposing a greater degree of proof than has been necessary in the
past, as was done in the instant decision. Who is to know better than the
Commission which is staffed by experts in the area of economics and busi-
ness practices, what constitutes a substantial lessening of competition. "The
precise impact of a particular practice on trade is for the Commission, not
the courts to determine."39 It would be an understatement to say that the
decision in the instant case was a setback to the FTC and we can only watch
and wait to determine whether the standard laid down in the instant case
will be followed, or rejected by other circuits in subsequent decisions con-
cerning section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, so far as "secondary
line" competition is concerned.
CHARLES K. BERGIN, JR.
Labor Law—Section 301 —Employee's Standing to Enforce Contract
Rights Against His Union—Humphrey v. Moore.'—Respondent Moore
brought a class action in a Kentucky state court, on behalf of himself and
his fellow employees, against his union and his company (Dealers). He
prayed for an injunction to restrain the implementation of a joint grievance
committee's decision to dovetail the seniority lists of his company with those
of another company (E & L) which was moving from the area. The two
companies had arranged to transfer certain rights to each other, and the
question arose whether Dealers was absorbing . E & L's business within the
meaning of Dealers' collective bargaining contract, 2 which fact would per-
mit dovetailing. When the issue first arose, the president of the local union,
which represented the employees of both companies, informed Dealers'
employees that their jobs were not in jeopardy since there would be no ab-
sorption. But, when the union became More advised as to the nature of the
88 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
so FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). The Supreme Court
is apparently more favorably disposed to the expertise of the FTC. "We are persuaded
that the Commission's long and close examination of the questions it here decided has
provided it with precisely the experience that fits it for performance of its statutory
duty." FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).Inclu1 375 U.S. 335 (1964), rehearing denied, 32 U.S.L. Week 3297 (U.S. Feb 25, 1964).cl des companion suit General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No.s
89 v. Moore.
2 Article 4, Section 5 of the contract was as follows:
In the event that the Employer absorbs the business of another private, con-
tract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of lines, the seniority of
the employees absorbed or affected thereby shall be determined by mutual
agreement between the Employer and the Unions involved. Any controversy
with respect to such matter shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure.
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transaction, they successfully recommended at the joint grievance committee
hearing that dovetailing be adopted. The committee's acceptance of the
suggestion effectuated Moore's pending discharge, which he alleged was a
breach of contract since the committee's decision exceeded its power and
since it was brought about by dishonest union conduct in breach of its
duty of fair representation. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky agreed. Apply-
ing state law, they reversed the trial court and granted a permanent injunc-
tion.3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, a majority of six
Justices, reversing, HELD: This action is one arising under Section 301 4 of
the Labor Management Relations Act and is, therefore, governed by federal
law. But on the merits Moore did not prove his case since the committee did
not exceed its power and the union did not breach its duty of fair representa-
tion.
The concurring Justices (hereafter referred to as "minority") agreed
with the majority that on the merits Moore did not prove his case. However,
while the majority treated the jurisdictional issue as an employee's suit
against his employer and his union for breach of contract, the minority
viewed the alleged cause of action as an employee's suit against his union,
which they contended should not be brought under section 301.
The inclusiveness of section 301(a) has evolved to where both state
and federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining con-
tracts,' provided federal law is applied .° The most recent extension of sec-
tion 301 is seen in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,7 which held that there
is concurrent jurisdiction regardless of whether the contract rights are
those of management, of union or of an individual employee.' Irrelevant
is the fact that there are elements of unfair labor practices present which
would ordinarily be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.°
Yet the sweep of section 301 was not made complete by Evening News,
on the question as to who has standing to sue under 301. It merely stated
that all employee suits are not excluded," thus leaving the questions as to
which breaches of contract are enforceable by an employee,'' and whether
3 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962).
4 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1958). Section 301(a) is as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having Jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
5 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
6 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
7 371 U.S. 195 (1962), noted 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 766 (1963). See generally
Kovarsky, Unfair Labor Practices, Individual Rights and Section 301, 16 Vand. L. Rev.
595 (1963).
8 Id. at 200.
9 Id. at 197.
10 Id. at 200, 201 n.9.
11 It should also be pointed out that generally some clauses in the collective
bargaining contract are promissory to the employees, while other clauses are promissory
to the union. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956).
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an employee can sue a union for these breaches. It is with this latter ques-
tion that the minority was concerned.
A reading of the majority opinion, by itself, leads one to believe that
they did not even consider the question of the employee's standing to sue
his union, but merely viewed the allegations of breach of contract by the
employer and the union as a cause of action coming within the purview
of Evening News. This seems to follow the traditional approach to section
301 actions of requiring a showing of a breach of contract.
On the other hand, the minority looked behind the facade of the alle-
gations, and found that the facts did not show any breach of contract by
the employer. They contended that at most a breach by the union might
be shown, and that that did not give a cause of action under 301. In light
of this, the majority opinion takes on a different meaning. It would appear
that the majority desired to expand the employee's rights under section 301,
and, when their opinion is read in conjunction with the more logical position
of the minority, their holding appears to be a policy decision.
Being a policy decision the Court framed its opinion in such a way
that, when the same problem arises in later cases, they could either dis-
tinguish Moore on its facts, or cite it for the rule of law that an employee
may sue his union for breach of contract under section 301. It is this aspect
that makes the Moore decision so confusing.
Another confusing factor is Moore's alleging two separate grounds for
breach of contract. Although the allegation of the union's breach of duty
of fair representation is of more concern to us, the first allegation that the
grievance committee exceeded its power is also significant.
The minority of three Justices, led by Mr. Justice Goldberg, concluded
that "a mutually acceptable grievance settlement between an employer and
a union . . . cannot be challenged by an individual dissenting employee
under § 301(a) on the ground that the parties exceeded their contractual
powers in making the settlement!" 12
 In fact, he added, the parties could
resolve their dispute by a joint agreement which applied, interpreted, or
amended the contract."
Mr. Justice Goldberg contended that the controlling case on this issue
is Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman," where it was "held that the existing labor
agreement did not limit the power of the parties jointly, in the process of
bargaining collectively, to make new and different contractual arrangements
affecting seniority rights."" Therefore, he reasoned, it should follow that a
settlement of a seniority dispute, deemed by the parties to be an interpreta-
tion of their agreement, is within their joint authority." "If collective bar-
gaining is to remain a flexible process, the power to amend by agreement
and the power to interpret by agreement must be coequal." 17
12 Supra note 1, at 352.
13 Id. at 353.
14 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
16 Supra note 1, at 354, 355.
16 Id. at 355.
17 Id. at 355. Observe that this position assumes that the same considerations that
allow the exclusive bargaining agent broad discretion in negotiating a contract, exist
when the parties attempt to interpret it. But cf. Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's
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Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority of the Court, decided
the question of whether an employee has standing to challenge the parties'
interpretation of their contract by tersely stating, "If we assume with Moore
and the courts below that . . . its [the Committee's] interpretation of the
section is open to court review, Moore's cause is not measurably advanced.'
The Court then concluded that the parties purported to proceed under the
contract, and that their interpretation was correct.
Thus, the majority never discusses the rationale of their decision to
allow the employee to contest the parties' interpretation of their contract."
Duty of Fair Representation, 22 Ohio St. L.J. 39, 49 (1961): "It is generally agreed
that, with respect to the rights of their individual members, unions have a much more
limited area of discretion in administering an existing collective agreement than in
negotiating a new one. ..." See Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Rela-
tions, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25, 46 (1959): "It is arguable that, whatever the needs for
flexibility and wide discretion in the negotiation of new or modification of existing
collective contracts, no such flexibility is either needed or appropriate, when rights un-
der a contract are involved."
But seemingly in agreement with Mr. Justice Goldberg is Dunau, Employee Participa-
tion in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 730, 748
(1950):
[Tihe employee has no standing to participate in thrashing out the interpreta-
tion of an existing employment standard to the extent that it purports to settle
the future scope of a disputed existing right. Insofar as it operates prospectively,
the interpretation of a standard, no less than its formulation, is within the ex-
clusive province of the representative, for the interpretative process is a policy-
making function which calls for the imaginative and informed choice of
available alternatives in construing an agreement. Whether the result is termed
an interpretation or a change of the agreement, its essence is to imbue it with
a new meaning to which the employees are bound in the future.
Accord, Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer,
8 Lab L J 316 324 (1957): "An Employee may also be bound by the union's inter-
pretation of the agreement." . .
It should be noted that the last two authorities cite as support for their argument,
Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934), which was decided under state
law, before federal participation in this area.
18 Supra note 1, at 345.
18 Mr. Justice Harlad agreed with the majority's decision on this question. One reason
he advanced was that "a committee with authority to settle grievances whose composi-
tion is different from that in the multiunion-multiemployer bargaining unit cannot be
deemed to possess power to effect changes in the bargaining agreement." Supra note 1,
at 359.
See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362, 397 (1962):
Although contract making (or amending) and contract administration are not
neatly severable, they are procedurally distinct processes. Most union con-
stitutions prescribe the method of contract ratification, and it is distinct from
grievance settlement; the power to make and amend contracts is not placed in
the same hands as the power to adjust grievances. . . . Through the ability to
change the agreement, the collective parties retain a measure of flexibility.
They are not free, however, to set aside general rules for particular cases, nor
are they free by informal processes to replace one general rule with a contrary
one.
Assuming the above is true, note that the record fails to indicate that the negotiating
parties were different from the members of the grievance committee.
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But, as has been submitted above, behind this decision lies a policy of ex-
panding the individual's rights under section 301.
On the second allegation of breach of duty of fair representation, Mr.
Justice Harlan joined Mr. Justice Goldberg, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr.
Justice Douglas, who argued that the union's alleged breach of its duty
cannot be treated as a claim of breach of the collective bargaining contract
supporting an action under section 301(a), especially where, as here, there
is no fraud charged against the employer 2 0
 Mr. Justice Goldberg recognized
that under appropriate circumstances, the union's breach may be extended
to the employer, as in Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.,?' but "there the em-
ployer willfully participated in the union's breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation and that breach arose from discrimination based on race. . . . 3,22
The majority of the Moore Court indicated that there was collusion
between the employer and the union:
No fraud is charged against the employer; but except for the im-
proper action of the union ... it is alleged that Dealers would have
agreed to retain its own employees. The fair inference from the com-
plaint is that the employer considered the dispute a matter for the
union to decide. Moreover, the award had not been implemented
at the time of the filing of the complaint, which put Dealers on no-
tice that the union was charged with dishonesty. . . 2 8
However, Mr. Justice Goldberg contended that this reasoning was too
strained to acknowledge collusive action between the employer and the
union. He stated that Moore's allegation should "be treated as an individual
employee's action for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation—a
duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but from the
National Labor Relations Act. . . . »24
On both of Moore's allegations it is hard to accept the majority's rea-
soning. Mr. Justice Goldberg's position is compelling unless we look at the
20 Supra note 1, at 355.
21 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
22 Supra note 1, at 356.
22 Id. at 343.
24 Supra note 1, at 351. Mr. Justice Goldberg states:
I read the decisions of this Court to hold that an individual employee has a
right to a remedy against a union breaching its duty of fair representation-
s duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but implied from
the union's rights and responsibilities conferred by federal labor statutes
Supra note 1, at 355, 356. In so doing he extended the employee's right to sue under
federal law against invidious classification, to where the alleged breach of the union's duty
involves a differentiation based on a relevant classification, i.e. seniority rankings. (The
majority did not have to delve into this issue because of their finding a breach of
contract.)
Mr. Justice Harlan generally agreed, but he added several questions: (1) "Does
such a federal cause of action [that Mr. Justice Goldberg found] come within the
play of the pre-emption doctrine, San Diego Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236
[1959], contrary to what would be the case were such a suit to lie under 301, Smith
v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 [196212" (2) even where it is alleged or proved
that the employer was a party to the asserted unfair union representation, would
such a suit be maintainable under section 3012 Id. at 360.
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majority's stand as an attempt to expand the scope of section 301 to in-
clude an employee's suit against his union when his contract rights are in-
volved. This was the way Moore classified his suit. 25 If the majority has made
a policy decision, it remains for us to evaluate any justification for this policy.
It should be first noted that the labor laws of the 1930's and 1940's
were predicated upon the valid presumption that unions and management
were basically antagonistic. 2° By reason of the adverse interests, the individ-
ual's rights were protected. But it is obvious that the union-management
relationship is different today, which fact would warrant a change in the
individual's status under the labor laws.
The big step in expanding the individual's rights under section 301
was taken in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n. 27 The arguments prior to that
case, concerning the individual's right to enforce the collective bargaining
contract, apply equally as well to this case 2B Of primary importance, how-
ever, is the determination of the scope of the NLRB's interest in the em-
ployee's grievance against his union. The NLRB suggested in Evening News
that the employee could enforce his contract rights against the employer
under section 301 even though an unfair labor practice was involved."
25 While Dealers Transport Company was made a party to the action, there
was and is no dispute between these respondents and their employer, Dealers
Transport Company, and Dealers has taken the position that it is a nominal
party to this suit, rather than a real party in controversy.
This, therefore, is a suit by individual members of a Union against the Union for
rights under an existing collective bargaining agreement.
Brief for Respondents, pp. 5-6.
26 Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management
Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 632 (1959).
27 Supra note 7.
28 To allow indiscriminate individual enforcement of rights under the col-
lective agreement entails the risk of significantly undermining two important
considerations in industrial relations. First, it makes employer operation cumber-
some and inefficient.... And the effectiveness of the union is threatened when
individual action undermines its ability to compromise the frequently con-
flicting interests of its constituency.
Hanslowe, supra note 17, at 44.
To summarize: Individual suits for the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements furnish the surest legal protection against the danger that selfish,
arbitrary or careless union officials will mishandle claims inuring to the benefit
of individuals and arising from their labor. However, this measure of protection
can be bought only at the cost, first, of giving the individual power to press
claims inconsistent with the interests of other workers and, second, of risking
serious impairment of the operation of the contract grievance procedure.
Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 Lab. L.J. 850,
857 (1957).
See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights,
75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (1962). Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the
Collective Agreement—A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 Yale L.J. 421
(1963).
25 Supra note 7, at 198 n.6:
The view of the National Labor Relations Board, made known to this Court
in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Solicitor General, is that ousting the courts
of jurisdiction under 301 in this case would not only fail to promote, but would
actually obstruct, the purposes of the Labor Mairagement Relations Act.
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It would seem that the suggestion should be followed here, where the em-
ployee seeks to enforce his contract rights against the union, instead of
against his employer."
If the Moore case is viewed in light of the above policy reasons, the
majority's opinion is understandable. If the Court is consistent, and if it
does not later distinguish Moore on its facts, the case should serve as a
foundation under section 301 to enable an employee to enforce his contract
rights against the union.
WILLIAM J. MCDONALD
80 [The] principle of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction should yield in suits on col-
lective agreements if: (1) assuring an expeditious remedy for contract breaches
is as significant a policy as making a forum available to those whose cases are
too small for the NLRB, or as providing a judicial remedy, in addition to that
available from the NLRB.. . .
Sovem, Section 301 And The Primary Jurisdiction Of The NLRB, 76 Harv. L. Rev.
529, 551 (1963).
But see Kovarsky, supra note 7, at 610: "An important reason for creating the
NLRB was to minimize judicial intervention and permit experts to deal with labor
problems."
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